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PUNITIVE DAMAGES VS. THE DEATH PENALTY: IN
SEARCH OF A UNIFIED APPROACH TO JURY
DISCRETION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Jose Felipe Anderson·

I. INTRODUCTION
The role of the jury in awarding monetary damages to plaintiffs in a wide
range of civil cases has captured the attention of the media, I contemporary nonfiction writers,2 and reform-minded politicians3 in recent years. Particular

• Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, Founding Director, Stephen L. Snyder
Center for Litigation Skills (2000-2008). I would like to thank the legendary Oscar S. Gray, my
professor and mentor at the University of Maryland School of Law, who invited me as a guest to
the 2000 American Law Institute Annual meeting to observe the important proceedings before I
was elected to the Institute in 2002. Through my observations of the Institute's important work I
gained great insight into this organization and its contribution to the development of the law. I
would also like to thank my primary research assistant, Anastasia Albright, on this article for her
outstanding research and written contribution. Additionally, I would like to thank Brendan
Thompson, Marc Campsen, Sarah Conkwright, and Jakisha Frierson, students from my spring 2007
Recent Supreme Court Decisions seminar, who provided their insight into the punitive damages
cases recently decided by the Court at that time and helped shape my views. I would like to thank
the University of Baltimore Foundation for the research grant that supported this project.
I With modem day instant access to media, jury trials can be closely followed by an interested
public. High profile trials like the OJ. Simpson case have brought the issue of jury reform to the
attention of the general public in recent decades. See Steven C. Serio, Comment, A Process Right
Due? Examining Whether a Capital Defendant has a Due Process Right to a Jury Selection Expert.
53 AM. U. L. REv. 1144 (2004).
2 Some writers argue that the jury system is deeply flawed. Journalist Stephen Adler, for example,
describes jury deliberations as "missing key points, focusing on irrelevant issues, succumbing to
barely recognized prejudices, failing to see through the cheapest appeal to sympathy or hate, and
generally botching the job." STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN
COURTROOM xiv (1994). In the context of the civil jury trial, Adler recognizes that the primary
reason advanced for their continued use is:
[J]uries are more likely than individual judges to be incorruptible and impartial.
In addition, civil cases often involve question of how the community wants
people to behave towards one another, and it has often been said that the jury,
as the voice of the community, is in the best position to serve as both constable
and referee.
Id. at 118.
3 Former Vice President and United States Senator Dan Quayle wrote that his interest in product
liability reform went back to his early days in Congress. He complained that "people look for a
way to trap someone in the regulatory forest and squeeze some money out of him in an outrageous
settlement just to end the expensive emotionally draining litigation. Nuisance suits is the familiar
term; legalized extortion might be even a better one." DAN QUAYLE, STANDING FIRM: A VICEPRESIDENTIAL MEMOIR 284 (1994) (emphasis in the original). John Silber, a college dean at the
University of Texas at Austin, was a candidate for Governor of Massachusetts when he wrote:
[nhere is . . . a growing war between business and the legal profession, as
manufacturers large and small find themselves the target for product liability
suits in ever increasing numbers, and with ever increasing awards to the
plaintiffs. And of course some lawyers who defend businesses from product
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attention has been focused on huge jury awards, which has led many
commentators to criticize the wisdom of permitting juries to move so much
4
money from one place to another. Although the right to a jury trial, and with it
the exercise of broad judicial discretion, is constitutionally based,5 many reform
efforts have moved toward removing juries from cases both as to the subject
matter of cases6 and the amount of money they can award. 7
An extensive report from commission after commission has moved for
more substitutes for the traditional jury trials as a means of resolving disputes. 8
Proponents of expanding the right to jury trial see most reform efforts as an
attack on the ancient sanctity of the trial by jury.9
At the center of the controversy have been the sometimes staggering
punitive damages awards that result from jury deliberations in high profile
cases.1O Corporations perceived to have deep pockets have sometimes been
subject to citizen jurors rendering sizable verdicts, leading to calls for limitations
on their discretion. I I It may well be that the potential for a devastating punitive
liability suits might well grieve as much as lawyers on the other side if product
liability law were to be substantially reformed.
JOHN R. SILBER, STRAIGHT SHOOTING: WHAT'S WRONG WITH AMERICA AND How TO FIX IT 228
(1989).
4 As one insightful commentator has noted, "[ t]reedom from restraint allows the exercise of the
great power of juries. This power is tempered by the sobering effect of the great responsibility. A
juror is and feels himself to be an integral part of our system of self government." SAMUEL W.
MCCART, TRIAL BY JURY: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE JURY SYSTEM 151 (1964).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
6 Many states have imposed severe statutory limitations on jury awards. See Joseph Sanders,
Reforming General Damages: A Good Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 115, 132
(2008).
7 Since the mid-1970s, there has been a considerable legislative reduction in the power of the jury
to award damages in certain categories of cases. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 87
(1983).
8 Many states, like Arizona, have engaged in extensive studies and reports in an effort to reform
jury trials. See G. Thomas Munsterman & Paula L. Hannaford, Reshaping the Bedrock of
Democracy: American Jury Reform During the Last 30 Years, 36 JUDGES' J. 5 (1997).
9 The former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, has
insightfully written that:
The jury is undoubtedly the institution that most distinguishes common-Law
procedure from the Roman and civil law. . .. As a substitute for trial by ordeal,
trial by battle or wager of law, trial by jury was a daring innovation as was ever
attempted in the history of the common law. . .. For it, no praise has been too
extravagant; it has been hailed as the palladium of individual freedoms and the
bulwark oflife and property.
ARTIlUR T. VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION 1190 (1952).
10 Multi-million dollar punitive awards in tobacco cases have fueled the controversy over the
legitimate power of the jury to assess damages. For example, the punitive civil damages jury award
of $229 million against the manufacturer of Vioxx has gained media attention. Jury Finds Merck
Liable in Landmark Vioxx Case: Widow of Texas Man Who Died After Taking Drug Awarded $253
Million, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 19,2005, http://www.msnbc.comlidl9006921/.
II Juries have traditionally been given broad discretion to determine damages with very little
guidance beyond jury instructions. Michael Freedman, The Tort Mess, FORBES, May 13, 2002, at
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damages award might be characterized as the equivalent of a corporate "death
penalty.,,12 Like capital punishment in the criminal law context, the perceived
need for an "ultimate punishment,,13 in the civil litigation arena has been justified
as way to address the wrongful conduct of the worst of the worst. 14
This article is an attempt to examine what reasonable reforms should be
made to jury discretion, particularly with regard to the jury's consideration of
punitive damages. 15 My hope is to advance a process that will strike a balance
between jury discretion and the valid concerns of those who perceive a need to
protect against arbitrary and unfair damages verdicts. Others have also
insightfully written in this area,16 but my approach builds on the structure for
controlling jury discretion fashioned by the American Law Institute ("ALI") in
its important work dealing with capital juries. 17
90 ("Out-of-controllawsuits are shutting down medical practices, killing businesses and costing the
economy $200 billion a year.").
12 A punitive damage award of many million dollars could easily bankrupt a company and put it out
of business. Id.
13 In a report on capital punishment, the American Law Institute noted:
Capital punishment constitutes only a tiny part of the criminal justice system.
Fewer than 50 people were executed and slightly over 100 people were
sentenced to death nationwide in 2007, while considerably over two million
people remain incarcerated in the non-capital criminal justice system. The
death penalty does not even constitute a substantial part of our system for
punishing homicide. In a country that has experienced between 15,000 and
20,000 homicides per year nationwide over the past decade, the number of
capital sentences and executions last year looks particularly trivial. The
relative paucity of death sentences and executions does not disappear if we
focus on the high-water marks for death-sentencing and executions in the
modern era, with highs for death sentences in the 300s (per year, nationwide)
and executions hovering close to 100 (per year, nationwide).
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REpORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY 44 (Apr. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.ali.orgidoc/Capital%20Punishment_web.pdf.
14 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) ("While some have suggested that standards to
guide a capital jury's sentencing deliberations are impossible to formulate, the fact is that such
standards have been developed. When the drafters of the Model Penal Code faced this problem,
they concluded 'that it is within the realm of possibility to point to the main circumstances of
aggravation and of mitigation that should be weighed and weighed against each other when they
are presented in a concrete case. ", (emphasis in original)).
15 State and federal judges already have a host a civil procedure rules that allow them to alter the
size of jury awards. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 391 (2005) (reviewing literature on damages).
16 David Baldus et aI., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview. with Recent Findingfrom Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638
(1998).
17 The ALI stated in its report on capital punishment:
The main provision ofthe Model Penal Code concerning capital punishment, §
210.6 . . . defines cases appropriate for capital punishment as follows: only
murder, then only if there are "aggravating circumstances," and even then, not
if "substantial mitigating circumstances call for leniency" or if the evidence at
trial "does not foreclose all doubt respecting . . . guilt." The section also
proscribes the death sentence for those under age 18 at the time of the murder
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The focus of my suggested reforms will examine the drafts of the ALI's
Model Penal Code that suggested reforms to the structure of how death penalty
decisions are made. In an interesting, indeed ironic twist, the very model ALI
statute that led to upholding the death penalty in many American jurisdictions has
recently been totally rejected, with the ALI deciding that it is no longer
appropriate to impose the penalty. In 2009, the ALI Council issued a position
that repealed its support for the death penalty provisions it had created. I Many
of its provisions were designed to separate criminal act determinations from
sentencing determinations to guide the discretion of the jury.19

and for those whose "physical or mental condition calls for leniency." Section
210.6 then mandates a special sentencing procedure in capital cases and
allocates sentencing authority between judge and jury. Specifically, the section
lays out two formulations from which states adopting the MPC would choose.
The one preferred by the Institute is for use of a jury in contested cases but with
the judge retaining discretion to reject a jury verdict of death. But the section
also sets forth an alternative procedure whereby the judge acts without the aid
of a jury. Thus, under either procedure, final discretion to sentence a defendant
to death lies with the judge. Additionally, the section requires the judge, and
when aided by a jury also the jury, to consider the aggravating circumstances
and mitigating circumstances delineated in the final subsections of the section.
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 2.
18 At the 2009 Annual Meeting, ALI members were asked to approve the following motion
regarding the death penalty:
MOTION: That the Institute withdraws § 210.6 of the Model Penal Code.
The motion will be presented on behalf of the Council, which
approved the same motion at its December 2008 meeting. In order to be the
position of the Institute, the approval of a majority of the ALI members present
when it is put to a vote at the Annual Meeting is required.
The Council makes one further recommendation: If a motion to
endorse or oppose the abolition of capital punishment is presented for a vote at
the 2009 Annual Meeting, the Council recommends that the members present
vote against the motion.
To assist the members in preparing for the consideration of this
matter at the 2009 Annual Meeting, the following report is being distributed in
advance to the entire membership. The report provides important background
information, including the history of the 1962 Model Penal Code's approach to
the death penalty, a recitation of why the matter is before us in 2009, and a
review of the process in which the Institute has been engaged over the past two
years to arrive at this point. In Section V, we discuss some of the
considerations and reasons for the Council's recommendations and decisions,
including its decision not to undertake a project to revise or replace § 210.6.
Section VI outlines the major concerns regarding the state of the death-penalty
systems in the United States today, as set forth more fully in a paper prepared
by Professor Carol Steiker and Professor Jordan Steiker at the request of ALI
Director Lance Liebman. The paper is summarized in and also annexed to this
report for information and not for approval.
Id. at I.
19 Some of those provisions include:
§ 210.6. Sentence of Death for Murder; Further Proceedings to Determine
Sentence.
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A. The Current Model Penal Code
When the ALI drafted the Model Penal Code in 1962, it offered no
opinion on whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment:
Despite the views of the Code's Chief Reporter (and later ALI
Director) Herbert Wechsler, the other Reporters, and most of the
Advisers, who favored excluding the death penalty as a sanction
available in the United States, the minutes of the March 1959 Council
meeting report "that it is undesirable for the Institute to take a position
on ... the abolition of capital punishment on the ground that this was a

(l) Death Sentence Excluded. When a defendant is found guilty of
murder, the Court shall impose sentence for a felony of the first degree if it is
satisfied that:
(a) none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection
(3) of this Section was established by the evidence at the trial or will be
established if further proceedings are initiated under Subsection (2) of this
Section; or
(b) substantial mitigating circumstances, established by the evidence
at the trial, call for leniency; or
(c) the defendant, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the
approval of the Court, pleaded guilty to murder as a felony of the first degree;
or
(d) the defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission ofthe crime; or
(e) the defendant's physical or mental condition calls for leniency; or
(f) although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not
foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt.
(2) Determination by Court or by Court and Jury. Unless the Court
imposes sentence under Subsection (1) of this Section, it shall conduct a
separate proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced
for a felony of the first degree or sentenced to death. The proceeding shall be
conducted before the Court alone if the defendant was convicted by a Court
sitting without a jury or upon his plea of guilty or if the prosecuting attorney
and the defendant waive a jury with respect to sentence. In other cases it shall
be conducted before the Court sitting with the jury which determined the
defendant's guilt or, if the Court for good cause shown discharges that jury,
with a new jury empanelled for the purpose.
In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that
the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature
and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history,
mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. Any such
evidence, not legally privileged, which the Court deems to have probative
force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary
rules of evidence, provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut such evidence. The prosecuting attorney and the defendant
or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of
death.

Id.
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political question on which the opinion of either the Councilor the
Institute could be of little help in settlement of the matter.,,20

The drafters of the Model Penal Code believed that if states were going
to have a death penalty,21 then any decision-making process should limit the class
of persons properly eligible for the punishment. 22 A primary tool that the ALI

20Id.
The American Law Institute made no recommendation in the 1962 Model Penal Code as to
whether capital punishment should be a sentencing option:
Despite the views of the Code's Chief Reporter (and later ALI Director)
Herbert Wechsler, the other Reporters, and most of the Advisers, who favored
excluding the death penalty as a sanction available in the United States, the
minutes of the March 1959 Council meeting report this conclusion: "that it is
undesirable for the Institute to take a position on ... the abolition of capital
punishment on the ground that this was a political question on which the
opinion of either the Council or the Institute could be oflittle help in settlement
of the matter." In presenting the Proposed Official Draft of the MPC at the
1962 Annual Meeting, one of the Reporters, Professor Louis Schwartz of the
University of Pennsylvania, said: "The Institute went through a great struggle
over whether to approve or disapprove the death penalty. We finally took the
course of providing the most reasonable standards and procedures for
application of the death penalty for use by those jurisdictions which chose to
retain it. Therefore we have bracketed the references to the death penalty, to
show the contingent character of the Institute's approval of the capital
punishment provisions."
Id. at 1-2.
22 Id. at 4. The ALI took a unique approach in determining that section 210.6 should be withdrawn:
The Program Committee's and Council's review and consultation,
informed by the papers produced by the Meltzer Committee and by the Steikers
and by the New Orleans conference, as well as by other sources, provide ALI
with a sufficient basis to proceed with the withdrawal of § 210.6 without
undertaking a traditional ALI project and to recommend that the Institute
neither endorse nor oppose the abolition of capital punishment. Among the
reasons that motivated many members ofthe Council are these:
A. Section 210.6 was an untested innovation in 1962. We now have
decades of experience with death-penalty systems modeled on it. The section
played an influential role in the evolution of American capital-punishment
systems and capital- punishment law over the last half century. However, since
the provision was approved by ALI, U.S. Supreme Court decisions have
reshaped the constitutional landscape with respect to sentencing generally and
the death penalty specifically, raising questions about some aspects of § 210.6.
Even though other aspects of the section-in particular, the categorical
exclusion of capital punishment as a punishment for juveniles and for crimes
other than murder and its doubts about it as a punishment for the mentally illproved to be prescient as confirmed in later constitutional jurisprudence, on the
whole the section has not withstood the tests oftime and experience.
B. Many on the Council have concerns, convincingly described in the
Steikers' paper and other sources, about the administration ofthe law of capital
punishment in the United States, including the administration of death-penalty
laws derived from § 210.6. A number of these concerns are outlined in Section
VI, infra. Unless we are confident we can recommend procedures that would

21
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suggested is the process of weighing and balancing aggravating circumstances,23
those characteristics of the crime which indicate eligibility for an ultimate
punishment, against mitigating circumstances/4 reasons that tend to reduce more
severe punishment.
Although there are similarities between death penalty determinations and
punitive damages determinations, I do not intend to suggest that the taking of a
human life should be lightly compared to financial awards designed to deter

meet the most important of the concerns, the Institute should not playa further
role in legitimating capital punishment, no matter how unintentionally, by
retaining the section in the Model Penal Code.
Id.
23 Some questioned whether the ALI should play a different role in its handling and
assessment of the death penalty:
Some Council members believe that since the death penalty will continue to be
imposed in some jurisdictions in the United States, the ALI could playa useful
role in recommending procedures that are consistent with current constitutional
requirements. Other members, supported by the arguments in the Steikers'
paper, believe that real-world constraints make it impossible for the death
penalty to be administered in ways that satisfy norms of fairness and process.
As ALI's current Sentencing project progresses, Director Liebman will
evaluate and may recommend new projects in the area of criminal law. At this
time, the Director, the Program Committee, and a large majority of the Council
are not convinced that an ALI effort to offer contemporary procedures for
administering a death penalty regime would succeed intellectually,
institutionally within what would surely be a divided membership, and
politically in terms of influence outside the Institute. Thus ALI will not
undertake a project concerning the death penalty.
!d. at 5.
24 Although nearly three quarters ofthe states have the death penalty as a sentencing option, "many
thoughtful and knowledgeable individuals doubt whether [these procedures] meet or are likely ever
to meet basic concerns of fairness in process and outcome." Concerns include:
(a) the tension between clear statutory identification of which murders should
command the death penalty and the constitutional requirement of
individualized determination;
(b) the difficulty of limiting the list of aggravating factors so that they do not
cover (as they do in a number of state statutes now) a large percentage of
murderers;
(c) the near impossibility of addressing by legal rule the conscious or
unconscious racial bias within the criminal-justice system that has resulted in
statistical disparity in death sentences based on the race of the victim; (d) the
enormous economic costs of administering a death-penalty regime, combined
with studies showing that the legal representation provided
to some criminal defendants is inadequate; (e) the likelihood, especially given
the availability and reliability of DNA testing, that some persons sentenced to
death will later, and perhaps too late, be shown to not have committed the
crime for which they were sentenced; and
(t) the politicization of judicial elections, where-even though nearly all state
judges perform their tasks conscientiously-candidate statements of personal
views on the death penalty and incumbent judges' actions in death-penalty
cases become campaign issues.
Id.
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improper business conduct. 25 Nevertheless, much can be learned from the Model
Penal Code regarding structural mechanisms to control jury discretion?6
Challenging jury discretion through a more or less fixed formula can provide
important guidance to both jurors and advocates in structuring litigation?7
I also will suggest that lessons learned from the Model Penal Code will
provide a structural opportunity to encourage the use of alternative dispute
resolution tools into the litigation process even after the trial has begun?8 This
may provide an opportunity for parties to resolve disputes before subjecting them

25 The Supreme Court has a long and complex history dealing with the constitutionality
of the death penalty:
Ten years after the MPC was promulgated, the Supreme Court, in
Furman v. Georgia (1972) (5-4), effectively invalidated traditional,
discretionary systems for the imposition of capital punishment. Each of the
nine Justices wrote an opinion. Two Justices thought capital punishment was
per se unconstitutional. The other three Justices in the majority found the death
penalty unconstitutional because of the lack of standards for determining how,
among the many persons convicted of murder, the decision was made to
sentence only a few to death; the resulting system, in the view of these three
Justices, led to the arbitrary and/or discriminatory imposition of the death
penalty.
By 1976, 35 states and the Congress had enacted new capital
punishment laws that attempted to address the concerns expressed by the three
decisive Justices in Furman. About half the states opted for mandatory death
penalties-an approach that the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in
1976 in Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana, which reasoned
that contemporary standards of decency require individualized consideration of
the appropriateness of a sentence of death in the particular case. The other
states enacted schemes seeking to confine discretion, typically by prescribing
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the majority of those states patterned
their efforts, more or less closely, on MPC § 210.6. In 1976, the Supreme Court
upheld statutes from Florida, Georgia, and Texas, in each case by a vote of 72. See Proffitt v. Florida; Gregg v Georgia; Jurek v. Texas. The Florida and
Georgia statutes were patterned, more or less closely, on the MPC; Texas's
statute took a quite different form, limiting capital murder to five categories of
murder and putting three yes/no questions to the jury that, in the Court's
judgment, adequately narrowed the reach of capital punishment while
permitting consideration of mitigating evidence.
The Commentaries to section 210.6, published in 1982, stated that the
Supreme Court's decisional law "amounts to a broad endorsement of the
general policy reflected in the Model Code provisions."
And as a
generalization, the legislative response to the 1976 decisions did tend to follow
the general approach of the MPC. Today, 38 states and the federal government
authorize the death penalty, and most have looked for guidance in some way to
section 210.6.
Id. at 13-14.
26 Again, the Institute prefers the use of a jury in contested cases, but with the judge retaining
discretion to reject a jury verdict of death. Id. at 2.
27 See supra note 25.
28 There are several scholars who suggest juries do not fully understand their responsibility.
Stephen P. Garvey et aI., Correcting Deadly Confosion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital
Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 627, 628 (2000).
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to consideration of punitive damages by a jury.29 Such an opportunity could
avoid lengthy and costly appeals. 30
Perhaps by resolving the most troublesome concerns of critics of the civil
jury trial system, other parts of the system can remain largely unaltered.
B. Implementing the Model Penal Code Approach
The great advantage of implementing the Model Penal Code approach in
civil jury trials for punitive damages is that by requiring the identification of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, guidance would be given to the jury
who is in effect being asked to impose a "death penalty" on a corporate
defendant. For example, in the criminal death penalty context, an aggravating
circumstance like "murder for hire" places society on notice that paying someone
to kill another human being places one in a special category of offender that
That hired killer behavior
would deserve the ultimate punishment. 31
contemplates a quantity of maliciousness that exceeds other types of murderers.
On the other hand, a mitigating circumstance like "no prior serious criminal
violations" seems to provide a fair opportunity to demonstrate that whatever
aggravating circumstance might be shown by the evidence, it should be balanced
against the absence of habitual dangerous behavior. 32
Such an approach is much sounder than an arbitrary ratio of punishment
approach currently embraced by the Supreme Court. One obvious reason that

There are many challenges inherent when valuing of life within a jury trial. See Patrick B.
Murray, Hedonic Damages: Properly a Factor within Pain and Suffering under 42 u.s.c. Section
1983, ION. ILL. U. L. REv. 37 (1989).
30 It has been noted that in the death penalty context:
[T]he existence of an extensive web of constitutional regulation with minimal
regulatory effect stands in the way of non constitutional legislative reform of
the administration of capital punishment-not only because such reform is
generally extremely unpopular politically, but also because political actors and
the general public assume that constitutional oversight by the federal courts is
the proper locus for ensuring the fairness in capital sentencing and that the
lengthy appeals process in capital cases demonstrates that the courts are doing
their job (indeed, maybe even over-doing their job, considering how long cases
take to get through the entire review process).
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,SUpra note 13, at 9.
31 For example, Maryland's death penalty statute contains the following provision for aggravating
circumstance: "(vi) the defendant committed the murder under an agreement or contract for
remuneration or promise of remuneration to commit the murder; (vii) the defendant employed or
engaged another to commit the murder and the murder was committed under an agreement or
contract for remuneration or promise of remuneration." MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2303(g)(I)(vi)-(vii) (LexisNexis 2010).
32
See
State
v.
Smith,
673
P.2d
17,
21
(Ariz.
1983).
After considering all the mitigation presented, including Smith's lack of a prior serious crime, the
Court found the cumulative mitigation "significant," but not sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency in light of the extreme cruelty and brutality of the crime.
29
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such an approach is desirable is because those aggravating and mitigating
circumstances have legislative sanction. When this legislative sanction is then
combined with jury discretion, it enhances the public policy to guide punishment
while at the same time respects the traditional role of the jury to fix punishment.
If no aggravating circumstances are found, then a case would be deemed
inappropriate for punitive damages. If aggravating circumstances exist, the jury
will be instructed to consider them alongside whatever mitigating circumstances
exist. The legislature could also require mandatory appeals before such jury
awards would become final. Such a system would also provide parties additional
opportunities to explore settlement of cases before a jury's consideration of
punitive damages.

C. Judging the American Jury
There is no institution made by man more controversial than the
American Jury system. 33 It has been praised and hated by people from all walks
of life. 34 The business community complains that it has paralyzed its ability to
groW. 35 Politicians have used it as grist for their mills calling for jury reform?6
Television and movies have dramatized its workings so that people who have
never actually served believe it to be a meaningless exercise.3? Even in the
Internet age, Web sites ridicule the work of juries in an effort to show that it is a
system prone to fail. 38
In many ways this general uninformed critique of the jury has done the
institution a disservice because it discounts the truly important daily work of the
institution in case after case without much notice. 39 Ordinary citizens who are
called on any given day in any state, federal, or county courthouse to resolve
disputes of all kinds between people or entities serve a critical societal function.40
A juror's responsibilities range from deciding whether a human being should be
executed for life-ending criminal conduct41 to deciding small disputes between

33

See LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 408-13 (1947).

It has been noted that at the heart of the dispute over the value of the jury is the concern that
"juries are incapable of adequately understanding evidence or detennining issues of fact ... [any]
better than a role of dice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).
35 Businesses often complain that the fear of frivolous litigation gets in the way of efficient
operation and profit. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform,
53 EMORY L.J. 1225 (2004) (discussing tort reform as an economic and business issue).
36 See Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L.
REv. 723 (1994).
34

37

Id.

38/d.

39 ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 208 (1955).

Id.
41Id. On an earlier occasion I wrote at length about my concerns over the United States Supreme
40

Court's approval of the use of victim impact testimony at death penalty sentencing hearings in its
two decades old decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). See Will the Punishment Fit

the Victims? The Case for Pre-Trial Disclosure. and the Uncharted Future of Victim Impact
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neighbors. 42 With only a notice received in the mail, a carpenter, fisherman, or
salesman could be sitting in judgment of a multi-national corporation; a plumber,
a housewife, or a government official may be required to answer to the process of
court adjudication. 43 In the most important disputes, the potential for a jury
decision always plays an important role in how the dispute is resolved. 44
Although most cases that are eligible for jury determination will never result in
one,45 it is the profound threat that such a determination may be necessary that
drives the entire litigation system in the United States46 and indeed, the world. 47
Still, the question of whether ordinary citizens should judge such important
matters without training or experience has troubled many observers of the legal

Infonnation in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 367 (1997). All my concerns voiced in
that earlier work remain, but the use of such information has been ruled constitutional. However, I
am at a loss to reconcile how it might violate Due Process to put a company out of business by the
use of broad victim information but does not offend Due Process to end a life by using similar
information of victim harm.
42 At an earlier time in my legal career I was counsel in a three-day jury trial that involved a fist
fight between feuding neighbors that began over, among other things, a parking dispute. The loser
of the fistfight sought civil damages in his lawsuit. I represented the winner of the fight who had
already been convicted of simple assault in criminal court and received a minimal sentence that did
not involve incarceration. After a short deliberation the jury found that the defendant had
committed the assault but awarded no damages. The trial judge, a veteran of many decades of jury
trials, had urged the plaintiffs to accept our settlement offer in chambers before jury selection,
essentially stating, "I see these cases all the time and the jury is going to give you about one dollar,
they do not like losing time from work or their families to give money to neighbors who cannot get
along even if they are clear who started the fight." Interviews with members of the jury after the
verdict confirmed the judge's comments in chambers.
43 Even a failure to report could lead to a citation for contempt or incarceration. An interesting
newspaper story reported:
Like two schoolboys ordered to stay after class, Donald Carstens and
Athanasios Katsoulis sat fidgeting in a Baltimore courtroom yesterday,
watching the clock and waiting until they could go home. They were lectured,
scolded about their behavior and ordered to remain in a paneled, windowless
circuit courtroom until 5 p.m. after Judge Edward J. Angeletti held them in
contempt as part of a crackdown on those who fail to appear for jury duty.
After a morning of hearing excuses, Angeletti ordered Carstens and Katsoulis
to stay for the day, fined them $100 and ordered them to pay $115 in court
costs.
Dennis O'Brien, Two No-Shows for Jury Duty Have Day in Court: 23 Scofflaws Appear,
BALTIMORE SUN, June 26, 1998, http://articles.baltirnoresun.comlkeywordljury-duty.
44 See United States ex rei. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1955) (discussing the importance
of a jury being made up of plain people).
4S About ninety-five percent of civil cases settle before trial. Large jury verdicts are often altered or
set aside by trial judges' settlement, remittitur, and reversal on appeal. See Michael G. Shanley, The
Distribution ofPost Trial Adjustments to Jury Awards, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 464 (1991).
46 The United States litigation system has been described as cumbersome and expensive. See
Lasson, supra note 36, at 755.
47 Several international writers have attacked the efficiency of the American litigation system. Our
Constitution, which has been the envy of many nations forming democracy, holds in high regard
the right to a jury trial. James Madison was reported to have described it as among the "most
valuable rights" in the Bill of Rights. RUTLAND, supra note 39.
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system. 48 Intense debate surrounds49 concerns over whether juries are even
capable of understanding the instructions on the law they are routinely given,50
warnings not to discuss the case until all the evidence is received,5! and complex
expert testimony.
Certainly there are other ways to resolve disputes rather than submitting
disputes to the trial by jury. The long-abandoned methods of combat,52 strange
ordeals,53 and other more mystical forms of proof have all been used and have
failed the test of time. 54 However, our current system of jury trial has been
criticized as bearing too much resemblance to a trial by combat, with lawyers
who use "scorched earth" tactics in a win-at-all-costs approach. 55 Some believe
that a jury trial is more theater than law, concluding that decisions ultimately are
votes for the best lawyer rather than the reasoned examination of the facts and the
law. 56 These concerns have prompted some bar association disciplinary
committees to more tightly control how lawyers may conduct themselves during
the news coverage of high profile trials. 57 Such rules are imposed for fear that

Some European systems use professional jurors. See John H. Langbien, Mixed Court and Jury
Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 195
(1981).
49 See infra notes 50-51.
50 There is considerable concern whether jurors listen to the instructions they are given. One
scholar has called into question whether death penalty jurors understand instructions given to them
by a trial judge, especially when they ask questions seeking clarification. Stephen P. Garvey et aI.,
Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REv.
627,628 (2000).
51 Jurors are not permitted to talk about a case while they are in the process of deciding it:
The courts have recognized that the exposure of jurors to news media reports
during trial has been a "very real problem for a long time." State v. Jones, 50
N.C. App. 263, 268 (1981). When there is a substantial reason to fear that the
jury has become aware of improper and prejudicial matters such as media
reports, inquiry by the trial judge is required.
UNC School of Government, Jury Misconduct, I NC DEFENDER MANuAL ch. 24, at 6 (draft 2008),
http://www.ncids.orglDefOIo20Manual%20InfolDefender_ Manual_Vol%202IDefenderManual_CH2
4.pd£ It should be noted that "although some may criticize the use of juries as factfinders because
of the potential to be influenced by pretrial publicity ... no research proves that judges are immune
from these same factors." Eang Ngov, Judicial Nullification ofJuries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at
Sentencing, 76 TENN. L. REv. 235, 282 (2009).
52Id.
53 See IAN WILLOCK, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY IN SCOTLAND 3-105 (1966).
54 In some parts ofthe world, professional jurors are used. See supra note 48.
55 WILLOCK, supra note 53.
56Id.
57 The First Amendment Handbook notes several cases addressing the ways a lawyer may properly
interact with the media:
See e.g., Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. order issued
Oct. 27, 1997) (restraining litigants and counsel from discussing the timing and
substance of discovery and identifying persons from whom discovery is
sought); United States v. McVeigh, 964 F. Supp. 313 (D. Colo. 1997)
(upholding trial court order restricting access and prohibiting all out-of-court
comments by trial participants)....

48
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jury pools and even actual sitting jurors will be influenced by statements made to
the media. 58 This is true in spite of the fact that judges frequently instruct jurors
to disregard media reports regarding the case. 59 These problems, combined with
the longstanding skepticism about lawyers,6o have encouraged reformers to
examine the jury trial and how it should be conducted.
Despite its detractors, many believe that the jury is the essence of our
democracy, demonstrating our commitment to a decentralized process through
citizen involvement in decision-making. 61 Although praised for its democratic
character, it is often called too unpredictable to be reliable. 62 The sometimes
inexplicable results of jury trials have led some critics to conclude that jurors are
simply getting "dumber.,,63 Many countries have largely dispensed with its use. 64
Others, like Great Britain, where the jury trial was born, while not eliminating it,
have drastically altered the control oflawyers selecting those who will serve. 65
The process of selecting jurors has been the source of much frustration as
of late. 66 The controversial concept of the peremptory challenge67 has inflamed

[But] see United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993)
(striking order preventing attorneys and law enforcement officials involved in
World Trade Center bombing case from speaking to the press; stating that
courts may impose some restrictions when necessary to protect the, but holding
that the order in Salameh was not narrowly tailored).
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Chapter 6-Gag Orders, The FIRST
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK, ch. 6 nnA & II (2011), http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/?pg=6I &PHPSESSID= 1dIDd027a26caaOa3008fdd332569881.
58 WILLOCK, supra note 53.
59Id.
60 As one observer documented several decades ago:
The most comprehensive American poll of the public's attitude toward lawyers
was undertaken in 1960 by the Missouri Bar .... [The poll revealed that] most
of the public and the lawyers themselves believed contingent fees in personal
injury cases were much too high. Many of the complaints about lawyers
overcharging came from people in the Kansas City area where the prevailing
contingent fee in the personal injury cases is 50 percent. Most people thought
25 percent or less would be fair. Nearly 57 percent of the people who used
lawyers thought lawyers created lawsuits unnecessarily, and that they didn't
make enough effort to settle cases as they should.
MURRAY TEIGH BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 341-42 (1969). It is "those
flamboyant personal injury lawyers who really besmirch the profession, starchy Big-Firm
lawyers grumble. They swoop down on disasters like vultures, sometimes even
disguising their runners as Red Cross workers or priests to sign up clients." DAVID W.
MARSTON, MALICE AFORETHOUGHT: How LAWYERS USE OUR SECRET RULES TO GET
RICH, GET SEX, GET EVEN ... AND GET AWAY WITH IT 35 (1991).
61 See, Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can: Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the Brave
New World ofJury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 343 (1998).
62 HAROLD J. ROTHW AX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 200 (1996).
63Id.
64 See Anderson, supra note 61.
65Id.
66 1d.
67Id.
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the paSSIOn of the public68 and been the subject of considerable judicial
attention. 69 The Supreme Court has extended the controversy over potential
raciaC o and gender71 discrimination from criminal cases72 to civil cases,73 thus
bringing battles over the proper selection of jurors to all high stakes litigation. 74
This has resulted in making the selection of juries a more complicated
proposition than ever before. 75
Trials of noteworthy black men like O.J. Simpson76 and former
Washington D.C. Mayor Marion Barry77 have resulted in heightened interest in
how juries make decisions in criminal cases. 78 In both of these trials, the jury
acquittal resulted in calls from segments of society to control juries, particularly
those including black jurors, from too easily acquitting black defendants. 79 The
notion that black jurors would favor black defendants has become known as
"racial jury nullification.,,80 It contemplates that in some cases jurors would
ignore the facts and the law and decide the case on racial considerations alone. 81
The idea that juries would ignore the facts and the law in order to acquit
is a longstanding exercise of jury power that dates to the foundation of our

68Id.
69Id.
70 The ALI, too, made note of racial prejudice in its report on capital punishment:
Several empirical studies have explored the subtle role of race
discrimination in death penalty attitudes. See, e.g., Steven E. Barkan & Steven
F. Cohn, Racial Prejudice and Support for the Death Penalty by Whites, 31 J.
of Research in Crime & Delinquency 202 (1994) (reporting empirical study in
which two indexes of racial prejudice were significantly linked to greater
support for the death penalty among whites, even after controlling for relevant
demographic and attitudinal variables); Robert L. Young, Race, Conceptions of
Crime and Justice, and Support for the Death Penalty, 54 Social Psychology
Quarterly 67 (1991) (empirical analysis finding that racial prejudice
significantly predicts both support for the death penalty and tougher crime
control policies).
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 29 n.l19.
71 See Anderson, supra note 61.
72 Id.
73 I d.
74 I d.
7S Id.
76Id.
77 [d.
78 [d.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 In analyzing this theory, the ALI noted:
Empirical research has found a strong association between life verdicts and the
presence of at least one African-American male on the jury in capital cases
involving African-American defendants and white victims. William J. Bowers,
et ai., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role
of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 171, 192
Table I (2001) (asserting "black male presence effects").
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 31 n.124.
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democracy.82 Indeed, its tradition predates the Declaration of Independence. 83 In
1670 a jury acquitted Quaker activists William Penn84 and William Mead,85 who
were charged with unlawful assembly.86 Ample evidence existed to support their
convictions, but despite being denied food and water the jury acquitted the men,
sending a strong political statement against the British monarchy that prosecuted
them. 87
That type of jury power is what the late Supreme Court Justice William
O. Douglas said "takes the sharp edges off the law and uses conscience to
ameliorate a hardship.,,88 Former President and Supreme Court Chief Justice
William Howard Taft called broad jury power a "protection of the individual ...
against the power of government .... ,,89
Still many argue that such power should not be used to address perceived
racism in the criminal justice system where statistical disproportion of all kind
exists in the prosecution of African Americans. 9o Some commentators have gone
so far to suggest that proposals encouraging black jurors to engage in such
conduct are "foolish and dangerous.,,91
It is unavoidable that jurors will sometimes act in race-conscious ways,92
and race alone is an improper basis on which to engage in nullification of the law
or the facts. However, when race becomes entangled with questionable political
considerations,93 racial motivation of prosecuting officials,94 or prosecutorial
excess and abuse of discretion,95 a jury may reach the conclusion that it will not
participate in furthering the unfairness in the case even though the facts suggest
guilt. 96
A jury, properly selected from the peers of the community, should be the
last word before someone loses their liberty in a free society.97 Recently, lawyers
have been going to great expense to develop techniques they believe will lead
them to predict what a jury is likely to do when it deliberates a case. 98 The use of

See Anderson, supra note 61.
!d.
84 !d.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 "The Jury takes the sharp edges off a law and uses conscious to ameliorate a hardship. Since it is
of the community, it gives the law acceptance which verdicts of judges could not." WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 112 (1954).
89 William H. Taft, The Administration of Criminal Law, 15 YALE LJ. 1,4(1905).
90 See Anderson, supra note 61.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93Id.
94 Id.
95Id.
96 I d.
97 I d.
98 Id.
82
83
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professional jury consultants have become a typical tool in high profile jury
cases. 99 Incorporating science and psychology,100 they have they have explored
IOI
ways to shape jury decisions rather than selecting merely impartial jurors.
Such techniques have relied in large part on racial and gender stereotyping lO2 in
an attempt to predict likely decisions in particular cases. 103
The Supreme Court has complicated this area of the law, making it
unclear whether jury selection consultants are in any way prohibited from
helping lawyers select juries by using race and gender bases demographic data. 104
Some modifications are obviously needed, but examining which reforms
make the most sense requires some restraint in proposing change. 105

D. The Model Penal Code and Control of Jury Discretion
In an effort to control juries in the death penalty process from making
arbitrary decisions, the American Law Institute made several proposals at its May
1959 meeting in the form of tentative drafts. 106 The Institute took no position on
the appropriateness of the death penalty.107 Instead, it recognized that the death
penalty ranked high among issues of public controversy in the criminal law.108
The drafters explained:
[T]he reporters favored abolition of the capital sanction. The Advisory
Committee recommended by a vote of 17-3 that the Institute express
itself upon the issue, of retention or abolition but substantially united in
the view that the institute could not be influential in its resolution and
therefore should not take a position either way. 109

The drafters believed that "it was clear that many jurisdictions would
retain the sentence of death for some form of murder for many years .... "lIO
This illustrated their belief that it was essential that the Institute address at least
two problems. "[F]irst, in what cases should capital punishment be possible; and
second, what agency and what procedure should determine whether the sentence
of death should be imposed."I'1

99

1d.

100 ld.
\o1/d.
\o2
\03

1d.
/d.

104/d.
\05 /d.

MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.6 n.1 07 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980).
1071d.
8
\0 1d. at Il O.
109 ld. at Ill.

106

ld.
1111d.

1\0
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The wisdom in the Institute's judgment on this point cannot be
overstated. Because of the philosophical differences that abound regarding
capital punishment,112 the legal processes by which it might be imposed are
113
The detail of the procedural framework for controlling juror discretion
varied.
reflects the potentially harsh consequences that the Institute perceived from an
114
unguided jury making such a serious decision.
In order to make it clear that the attempt to develop a suitable decisionmaking framework for capital decisions would not be misunderstood, the
Institute emphasized its cautionary tone: "It bears repeating, however, that
inclusion of this provision in the Model Code does not signal Institute
endorsement of capital punishment, nor does the optional authorization of this
penalty under the statute reflect an Institute decision in favor of abolition. ,,115
The first level of protection, that of the identification of aggravating
circumstances, contemplates a need for legislative determinations about what
crimes and circumstances should be considered the worst of the worst in order to
impose the ultimate penalty.1l6 Requiring a jury to make findings of the
existence of these circumstances prior to being permitted to move on to the
question of whether death should be imposed is a reasonable control over
decision-making discretion. I 17
The constitutional violations that occurred are particularly egregious
because they involve fundamental protections that were contemplated by the
Supreme Court in its early post-Furman v. Georgia l18 capital punishment
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has reminded us that "where discretion is
afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether
a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action.,,119
In Gregg, the Supreme Court held that the Georgia capital punishment
statute was not unconstitutional because, among other things, it provided
adequate procedural safeguards to prevent the jury from considering issues in a
manner that was not unfairly prejudicial to the accused. 120 The court pointed out
that "bifurcation" of the capital sentencing hearing was the primary safeguard
needed to prevent the jury from misusing the information they had been given. 121
In this case the absence of bifurcation at petitioner's resentencing was

112 See Peter Arenella, Rethinking Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Court's Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 198-99 (1983).
1\3 Id.
114Id.
1I5Id.
116 See supra note 23.
1I7 I d.
118 4 08 U.S. 238 (1972).
119 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,189 (1976).
120Id.
121Id.
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particularly prejudicial because that jury heard evidence about the impact of the
crime on the victims before any evidence was presented, or findings made, about
the perpetrator or perpetrators of the crime. 122
The Supreme Court has never contemplated that a constitutional
sentencing procedure could occur in the complete absence of the procedural
protection that is supplied by bifurcation. "Given the gravity of the decision to be
made at the penalty phase, the state is not relieved of the obligation to observe
fundamental constitutional guarantees.,,123
The procedural protection lost at the resentencing because of the highly
unusual order of proof, permitted the jury to consider the evidence in a manner
likely to produce a decision that was "wanton[,]" "freakish" and as arbitrary as
being "stuck by lightening[.]"124 The Supreme Court has required that any
decision to impose the death penalty be based on reason rather than emotion or
caprice. 125 The standard for assessing the constitutional violation is not reduced
because the proceedings at issue are a resentencing trial. As the Supreme Court
has clearly recognized, "fundamental principles of procedural fairness apply with
no less force to the penalty phase of a capital case than they do in the guiltdetermining phase of any criminal trial.,,126 It is certainly possible that the
resentencing jurors, relying only on the prior findings of guilt by another jury and
the emotional content of victim impact testimony, will render a death sentence.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that a death sentence must
be vacated if it is possible that the jury may have improperly delegated some of
the responsibility for rendering the death sentence to another part of the criminal
justice system. 127 The resentencing jury, already aware that the petitioner was
convicted of committing a capital crime, should have made the factual
determination that the petitioner was a principal to the crime before assessing the
other emotionally-charged evidence in the case. Otherwise, they would be
tempted to rely too heavily on the work of the prior jury.
The Supreme Court further never contemplated that in a resentencing a
jury be permitted to issue a death decision with adequate guidance from the
sentencing judge and sentencing forms. 128
The petitioner is entitled to have his sentence set by a jury that is
properly instructed. 129 There can be no presumption that the jury understood the
charge in a constitutional manner when there "exists the reasonable possibility

122/d.

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981).
See Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-310 (1972).
125 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
126 Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16 (1978).
127 See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (holding that a prosecutor's argument that the
death penalty case would be reviewed by the state supreme court made their findings invalid).
128 See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (holding that confusion created by a sentencing
form required the death sentence be vacated).
129 See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980).
123

124
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that the jury relied on an unconstitutional understanding of the law .... [Under
these circumstances,] that verdict must be set aside." l3O

E. The Lightning Rod of Punitive Damages Awards
The specter of punitive damages awards in civil litigation is among the
most controversial areas in all of American law.!3! The possibility that they may
be awarded lurks a constant threat to American business.132 The potential that one
day punitive damages may not be available has been seen as the denial of a
critical right of the injured and the loss of a necessary deterrent to extreme
misconduct. 133

II. TREATMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY THE SUPREME
COURT: PHILIP MORRIS V. WILLIAMS AND
EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY V. BAKER
[T]he generality of men are naturally apt to be swayed by fear rather
than reverence, and to refrain from evil rather because of the
punishment that it brings than because of its own foulness.
Aristotle 134

A. Background
Arousing much criticism and discussion, punitive damages are a civil
remedy whose purpose sprouts from the same seed as criminal punishment. !35

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.8 (1985).
The constitutionality of punitive damages has been both validated and invalidated in different
states. Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Requiring
that Percentage of Punitive Damages Awards Be Paid Directly to State or Court Administered
Funds, 16 A.L.R.5th 129 (1993). Such laws have been invalidated under the Equal Protection
Clause when they apply to plaintiffs in some circumstances and not others, and under the Taking
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. For an analysis of Oregon's law specifically, see Junping
Han, Note, The Constitutionality of Oregon's Split-Recovery Punitive Damages Statute, 38
WILLAMEITE L. REv. 477 (2002).
132 Id.
133 See Carl T. Bogus, Introduction to Symposium, Genuine Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2008):
Lawsuits shine light into dark corners, exposing corporate wrongdoing or
shortcuts that have placed citizens at risk. Indeed it may be the exposure
function that matters most, even more than money judgments. But of course
money matters too, providing incentives for businesses and health care
providers to [md ways to reduce injuries.
Jd.
134 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN Enncs 346 (F.H. Peters trans., Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 2d
ed. 1884).
135 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504 (2008) (stating that punitive damages and
criminal sanctions serve the common purpose of punishment and deterrence) (citing Browning130

131
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Punitive damages or exemplary damages are often viewed as society's "moral
condemnation" of a civil defendant's misconduct and are expressed by imposing
a monetary penalty on the defendant in order to punish and deter. 136 In particular,
punitive damages are not awarded to "redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff
has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct," but rather are
awarded to a plaintiff in a tort case, in addition to compensatory damages, when
the defendant's action was reckless or malicious. 137 The imposition of punitive
awards is not a modem-day innovation, but is traceable to the Code of
Hammurabi. 138 In early American jurisprudence, cases imposing punitive
damages, or damages in excess of actual injury to the plaintiff, took the position
that punitive damages were administered both to penalize the defendant and to
compensate the plaintiff for intangible wrongs. 139 By the 1850s American courts

Ferris Indus. ofVt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1995)); see Developments in
the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation JII: Problems and Proposals in Punitive Damages Reform,
113 HARV. L. REv. 1783, 1784-88 (2000) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (describing
punitive damages as having "a questionable logic" and detailing the "widespread" criticism of
punitive damages); see also Jeffery L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing
Punishment, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker and the notion of regularizing punishment); Michael L. Rustad, The Closing
of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1297, 1298-1303 (2005) (disagreeing with
the portrayal of punitive damages as unpredictable and out of control, and discussing tort reform in
the area of punitive damages).
136 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (holding that a
federal appellate court should apply a de novo standard when reviewing a district court's
determination of the constitutionality of a punitive damage award); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S.
363, 371 (1851) (noting that punitive awards are exemplary and penalizing rather than
compensatory); LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 19 (4th ed.
2000).
137 Cooper Indus., Inc., 523 U.S. at 432; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 418 (8th ed. 2004); Rustad,
supra note 135, at 1304 (explaining that the majority of states mandate a plaintiff to prove the
defendant acted maliciously to be eligible to receive punitive damages, but no state allows the
recovery of punitive damages for mere negligence).
138 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 136, at 1. The Code of Hammurabi is a collection of
Babylonian laws that formed during the rule of Hammurabi, which spanned from 1792-1750 Be.
Code
of
Hammurabi,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.comlEBcheckeditopicI253 71 O/Code-of-Hammurabi (last visited Mar. 1,
2011). The Code includes Hammurabi's legal decisions that were gathered near the end of his rule
and inscribed in a Babylonian temple. Id. An example of exemplary damages found in the Code of
Hammurabi includes a penalty that requires a common carrier, who did not deliver goods entrusted
to him, to pay fivefold their value. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 136, at 1-2; see also Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 490-92 (2008) (discussing the historical roots of punitive
damages).
139 See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 136, at 14-16 (discussing punitive damages in Colonial
America); Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1383, 1390
(2009) (briefly outlining the history of punitive damages in America). The concept that punitive
damages were not strictly awarded to deter and punish the defendant's conduct arose from the
English Common Law. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 136, at 7. Some authors theorize that
punitive damages developed in part to compensate for mental anguish and other non-pecuniary loss
such as insult or hurt feelings, which were not recoverable in English courts during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Id. at 6-8.
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pronounced that punitive damages were predominately aimed at punishment, and
not compensation. 140
In addition to the trail of history that has led to the present day status of
punitive damages, it is important to note that states, as entities separate from the
federal government, may exercise significant discretion in determining how and
when to impose punitive damages in order to further their "legitimate interests in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.,,141 Although the scope
of this Article does not encompass the variation of punitive damage regimes
among states, it is worthwhile to illuminate that state regulation of punitive
damages and the procedure by which punitive damages may be awarded is far
from uniform. 142 For example, Nebraska prohibits punitive damages altogether
while four other states only allow punitive damages when sanctioned by state
statute. 143 Other states limit the awarding of punitive damages by imposing
monetary caps.l44 For states that allow punitive awards, the amount is generally
first calculated by a jury and then "reviewed by trial and appellate courts to
ensure that it is reasonable.,,145
Diverse state approaches to punitive damages should not be misguiding,
for the discretion is not unlimited, but must be exercised within the confines of

140 See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (explaining that punitive or exemplary
damages are awarded based upon the egregious nature of the defendant's conduct in order to punish
rather than compensate); SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 136, at 16 (summarizing the current
status of punitive damages in America). In addition, the transition of punitive damages to a noncompensatory function is suggested to be a result of the broadening of injuries considered
compensatory overtime. See Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 437 n.ll (2001).
141 BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
142 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 494.
143 Id. (reviewing the diversity in state approaches to punitive damages); Flesner v. Technical
Commc'ns Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Mass. 1991) (stating that punitive damages are
prohibited unless expressly authorized by statute); Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co. v. Cox,
443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989) (holding that punitive damages prohibited under Nebraska
Constitution); Fisher Properties, Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986) (stating
that punitive damages are prohibited unless expressly authorized by legislature); see also N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2009) (holding that no punitive damages shall be awarded in any action,
unless otherwise provided by statute); Rustad, supra note 135, at 1304-05.
144 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 494. Some examples include ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(a) (2009)
(holding that no award of punitive damages shall exceed three times the compensatory damages of
the party claiming punitive damages or five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), whichever is
greater); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5. I (e)-(g) (2009) (imposing a monetary cap on punitive damage
award for tort actions not statutorily stated to be without a cap, such as products liability); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 6-1604(3) (2009) (imposing a monetary cap on punitive awards); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
510.265(1)-(2) (West 2009) (imposing a monetary cap on punitive awards); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§42.005(1)(a)-(b) (West 2009) (imposing a monetary cap on punitive damage except in stated
actions); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (West 2009) (requiring that the total amount of punitive
damages may not exceed $350,000). For a detailed analysis of state punitive damage regimes see
Rustad, supra note 135, at 1370-1417 app. A.
145 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (noting that generally jury instructions provide juries with
wide latitude in designating the amount of a punitive award).
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the United States Constitution. '46 The Supreme Court has held that punitive
damages exceed the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when the amount is grossly excessive or arbitrarily determined. '47
Punitive damages that reach the point of arbitrariness are reasoned to violate the
principle of fairness and notice guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. 148 In
other terms, a person is constitutionally entitled to fair notice of the severity of
the punishment that a state may impose, and obtaining fair notice is unachievable
when a civil penalty is so extraordinarily exorbitant when compared to the
interests it is alleged to further. 149 Moreover, when punitive damages are deemed
grossly excessive, the Court has concluded their award no longer furthers any
legitimate state purpose and constitutes "an arbitrary deprivation of property" in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. '5o
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Supreme Court in a five-tofour decision outlined "three guideposts" to be utilized by reviewing courts to
determine whether a punitive damage award is grossly excessive and
consequently unconstitutionally denied the defendant fair notice. '51 The three

146 See BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 568 (1996) (explaining that states may exercise "considerable
flexibility" when determining whether to allow punitive awards and, if so, for what cases and how
much, but awards that are "grossly excessive" violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
147Id
148 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417. An article authored by Jeffery L. Fisher discusses Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on punitive damages. Fisher, supra note 135,
at 1-2. Fisher believes that it is not absolutely clear whether the Court has instituted constitutional
guidelines for punitive damages based upon procedural due process or substantive due process. Id.
at 3. If the holdings of the Supreme Court stem from substantive due process, Fisher reasons that
then the ultimate conclusion is the Due Process Clause always forbids a jury from issuing grossly
excessive punitive awards. Id. However, if the holdings are procedural in nature, Fisher concludes
that then legislatures and courts are able to allow excessively high punitive damage awards as long
as the "law provides fair notice, the court gives clear jury instructions, and related rules of fair play
are followed." Id. In his article, Fisher takes the position that the Court's holdings are substantive
in nature. Id at 4.
149 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417.
150 See id In addition to concerns of fair notice, the Supreme Court has also expressed heightened
worries surrounding punitive awards due to the fact they are often administered in an "imprecise
manner." Id The Court views this as especially distressing because criminal penalties and
punitive damages serve the same aim of punishment and deterrence, yet a civil defendant does not
receive the same protections as those present in a criminal trial. Id. It appears that others share the
Court's concern; in an Article regarding punitive damages, Dan Markel opines that the Court has
yet to provide defendants susceptible to punitive damages the protections generally afforded during
criminal proceedings. Markel, supra note 139, at 1393.
151 See BMW ofN. Am., 517 U.S. at 574 (1996). The BMW case arose after an Alabama jury found
BMW liable to Dr. Ira Gore for $4000 in compensatory damages and four million dollars in
punitive damages. Id at 562-65. The jury found BMW, an automobile distributor, liable for fraud
based upon its nationwide policy of not disclosing damages that occurred to its new cars prior to
delivery when the cost of repair did not exceed three percent of the suggested retail price. Id. at
562. The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the amount of punitive damages to two million dollars
based upon its finding that the jury improperly calculated the punitive award by multiplying Dr.
Gore's compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in other states. Id at 567. The
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guideposts consist of the reprehensibility of the defendant's unlawful conduct,
the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damage amount, and the difference between the damages awarded and
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in similar cases. 152
Reprehensibility is considered to be the pivotal indication of whether a
punitive award is grossly excessive. 153 Yet, a state cannot impose punitive
damages in order to punish a defendant for conduct that lawfully occurred
outside of the state's jurisdiction. 154 In regard to the second guidepost, the Court
has not imposed an absolute constitutional limit on the ratio between the amount
of compensatory damages and the punitive sum, but has reflected that "few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.,,155 In addition, a

Supreme Court held that the two million dollar punitive award was grossly excessive in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 585. In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that states
maintain diverse approaches to what automobile distributors are required to disclose in regard to
car damage prior to sale. Id. at 569. The Court found that Alabama could not impose punitive
damages on BMW in order to deter or punish its conduct that was lawful in other states. Id. at 572.
In light of this rule, the Court applied the three guideposts only as they related to the interests of
Alabama consumers, not the entire nation. Id. at 574. In other words, the reprehensibility of
BMW's conduct did not include an evaluation of BMW's non-disclosure policy in other states. See
id. at 574-80.
152Id. at 574-75. One commentator criticizes the Supreme Court's guideposts set forth in BMW
because, despite the achievement of "systematically reduc[ing] some of the highest awards," there
was no success in remedying the unfairness of punitive awards among similarly situated defendants
and the unpredictability of the size of the award. See Developments in the Law, supra note 135, at
1788-89.
153 BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572. When determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct, courts are to consider:
[Whether] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evidenced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or
safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the
conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm
was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. In State Farm, the Court explained that the defendant should only be
held accountable for punitive damages if after the imposition of compensatory damages, the
defendant's blameworthiness is "so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions
to achieve punishment or deterrence." Id. at 419.
154 BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572, 575; State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421. As explained, a jury must
be instructed not to utilize evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish the defendant for conduct that
was legal in the jurisdiction where it took place. BMW ofN. Am., 517 U.S. at 572-73 (referring to
BMW's nationwide non-disclosure policy). Moreover, in State Farm the Court reasoned that a
state may not impose punitive damages to punish and deter actions of the defendant that were
unrelated to the plaintiff's actual harm. 538 U.S. at 422. Specifically, the Court stated that the
reprehensibility guidepost may not be used by courts to allow a defendant to be punished for all
possible wrongdoing committed against anyone when such acts are dissimilar to the conduct shown
to harm the plaintiff. See id. at 424. In State Farm, evidence was introduced of State Farm's
malfeasance in regard to the handling of insurance claims, but the only commonality to the
plaintiff's case was the involvement of State Farm, which the Court found irrelevant in an analysis
of State Farm's reprehensibility. Id. at 423-24.
155 !d. at 425.
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federal appellate court must apply de novo review when assessing a district
court's analysis of the constitutionality of a punitive award. IS6

B. Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams
Eleven years after the Supreme Court guaranteed fair notice to civil
defendants by eliminating grossly excessive punitive awards, the Court faced the
question of exactly for whose injury a jury may punish the defendant under the
Constitution. Set against the backdrop of a widow's legal battle against a
cigarette company for the smoking-related death of her husband, the Supreme
Court held in Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams that it is unconstitutional for a jury
to take into account its "desire to punish the defendant for harming persons who
are not before the court (e.g., victims whom the parties do not represent)" when
calculating a punitive damage award because this constitutes a taking of property
from the defendant without due process oflaw.157
The Philip Morris case arose when Mayola Williams brought suit
against Philip Morris, at the time the largest manufacturer of cigarettes in the
United States, alleging negligence and fraud, and seeking compensation and
punitive damages for her husband's death. ISS An Oregon jury found Philip

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001).
Philip Morris, U.S.A. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007).
158 Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. 2002). The Oregon Court of Appeals
summarized the evidence regarding the defendant's advertising campaign as follows:
[T]he industry established its strategy and began developing its public image in
response to a decline in cigarette sales in 1953 that was the apparent result of
studies that showed that cigarette tar could cause cancer in mice and that
established the existence of statistical correlations between smoking and lung
cancer....
Between 1954 and the I 990s, [research organizations created by
Phillip Morris and other companies] developed and promoted an extensive
campaign to counter the effects of negative scientific information on cigarette
sales. The individual tobacco companies, including [Philip Morris], were part
of the organizations and acted in cooperation with them. At first, the industry
publicly denied that there was a problem; for example, in the 1950s and early
1960s, [Philip Morris'] officials told the public that [Philip Morris] would "stop
business tomorrow" if it believed that its products were harmful. For most of
that period, however, the industry did not attempt to refute the scientific
information directly; rather, it tried to find ways to create doubts about it. The
industry's goal was to create the impression that scientists disagreed about
whether cigarette smoking was dangerous, that the industry was vigorously
conducting research into the issue, and that a definitive answer would not be
possible until that research was complete. As one of [Philip Morris'] vicepresidents explained in an internal memo, the purpose was to give smokers a
psychological crutch and a self-rationale that would encourage them to
continue smoking....
[Philip Morris'] director of research in the late 1970s and 1980s
explained to a subordinate that his job was to attack outside research that was
inconsistent with the industry's position by casting doubt on it. ...
156

157
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Morris liable and awarded $79.5 million in punitive damages on the fraud claim,
which was found to be grossly excessive by the trial court and reduced to thirtytwo million dollars. 159 Philip Morris argued that the jury's award was
unconstitutional because it was issued in part to punish it for harm to victims
other than the plaintiff. 160 This argument mainly centered around the trial court's
refusal to give Philip Morris' proposed jury instruction No. 34, which
specifically told the jury it could not issue punitive damages to punish Philip

At least by the 1970s, there was absolutely no scientific basis for
denying the connection between cigarette smoking and cancer and other
diseases. However, [Philip Morris] continued to assert that the hazard of
cigarette smoking to health was uncertain when it actually knew that there was
no legitimate controversy about that subject.
Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 128-129 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
159 [d. The procedural history surrounding the Philip Morris case is somewhat complex. After the
trial court reduced the jury's punitive award from $79.5 million to thirty-two million dollars, both
Williams and Philip Morris appealed. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Or.
2008). The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's reduction and reinstated the $79.5
million punitive award. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 842, adh'd to on recons., 51
P.3d 670 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial's court's refusal to
adopt Philip Morris' proposed jury instruction No. 34, which specified the jury cannot award
punitive damages to punish Philip Morris for harm allegedly caused to nonparties. [d. at 837-38.
The Oregon Supreme Court declined to review the appellate court's decision. Williams v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 61 P.3d 670 (Or. 2002). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Oregon
Court of Appeals decision and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light
of State Farm, 538 U.S. 408. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003). On
remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals adhered to its previous decision that the $79.5 million
punitive award did not violate due process and the trial court did not err in refusing Philip Morris'
proposed jury instruction No. 34. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 126 (Or. Ct. App.
2004). The Supreme Court of Oregon accepted Philip Morris' petition for review and affirmed the
decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals. Williams v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 127 P.3d 1165,
1167-68 (Or. 2006). The Supreme Court then granted certiorari for a second time, but only
discussed the Constitution's "procedural limitations" surrounding the use of punitive damages to
punish a defendant for injury to nonparties, and did not address whether the punitive award in the
particular case was grossly excessive. Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007).
The Court explained that prior cases did not expressly state a jury may not issue punitive damages
in order to punish the defendant for harm to nonparties and as a result the Oregon Supreme Court
applied an incorrect constitutional standard when reviewing Philip Morris' appeal. [d. at 356-57.
Due to the possibility that applying the standard set forth by the Court may call for a new trial or
change in the amount of punitive damages, the Court did not evaluate whether the award was
grossly excessive in violation of the Constitution. [d. at 357-58. The Court vacated the decision of
the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings so that the Oregon Supreme
Court could apply the correct constitutional standard. [d. at 357-58. On remand, the Oregon
Supreme Court discovered that Philip Morris' jury instruction No. 34 incorrectly stated Oregon law
so that the trial court properly refused to give it and as a result reaffirmed the decision of the
Oregon Court of Appeals reinstating the jury's punitive award of $79.5 million. Williams v. Philip
Morris U.S.A., Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1263-64 (Or. 2008). The Supreme Court granted certiorari for
a third time on the issue regarding the Oregon Supreme Court's holding and then certiorari was
dismissed as improvidently granted. Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams 553 U.S. 1093 (2008);
Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
160 Philip Morris US.A., 549 U.S. at 350.
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Morris for harm allegedly caused to victims who are not party to the action and
who may file lawsuits of their own. 161
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, gave three reasons
for holding that a jury may only constitutionally use punitive damages to punish
the defendant for harms inflicted upon parties to the litigation. 162 First, the Court
concluded that since the Due Process Clause forbids a state from punishing a
defendant without fIrst providing "an opportunity to present every available
defense," the Due Process Clause also prohibits a state from punishing a
defendant for harm against anyone besides the plaintiff. 163 This is so because one
cannot fairly defend against accusations concerning harm caused to individuals
not party to the litigation since there is no opportunity to establish facts that
could, for example, demonstrate that the nonparty would not be entitled to
damages if actually a party or the nonparty's factual standing is distinguishable
from the current plaintiff. l64 Stated differently, the Court viewed the direct
punishment of a civil defendant for injury allegedly caused to strangers to the
litigation as constitutionally unfair because it removes the defendant's ability to
present an effective defense in regard to such harms. 165
The second reason arose from the fear that an opposite result would
intensify the arbitrariness, absence of fair notice, and uncertainty surrounding
punitive damages and as a result create increasing "fundamental due process
concerns" about punitive awards in general. 166 If a jury is constitutionally able to
take into account injury to nonparties when formulating the amount of a punitive
award, the jury would be able to apply limitless speculation when defIning and
determining a corresponding sum to penalize and deter for the alleged injury to
such nonparties. 167 This is so, the majority concluded, because generally the trial
would not provide evidence as to the number, condition, and circumstances of
nonparty victims. 168 The third reason was that no prior authority existed
suggesting that juries may award punitive damages for the direct punishment of
the defendant for harm allegedly caused to anyone other than the plaintiff. 169
Although the Court found that due process disallows the use of punitive
damages to penalize a defendant for injury to nonparties, harm to nonparties may
be shown by the plaintiff in order to establish that the defendant's conduct was

161 See id. at 350-51. Philip Morris asserted the necessity of its jury instruction because Williams'
attorney made remarks to the jury encouraging the jury to contemplate the harm Philip Morris
caused to all other smokers in the state. [d. at 350.
162 [d. at 353-54.
163/d. at 353.
164 See id. at 353-54.
165 See id. at 353.
166 [d. at 353-54 (citing BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,417 (2003)).
167 See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 354.
168 [d.
169 [d.
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more reprehensible than if it had only injured the plaintiff. 170 Accordingly, when
calculating a punitive award, a jury is constitutionally restricted from forming an
amount based in part on the desire to punish the defendant directly for harms
committed against nonparties and constitutionally free to take into account harm
to nonparties when determining the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct. 171 The idea seems to be that action that threatens injury to many is more
reprehensible and in need of a greater punitive award to punish and deter than
action that threatens only some.172 The use of nonparty harm to show heightened
reprehensibility was found by the Court to be comparable to recidivism
statutes.173 Just as a criminal can be subject to a harsher penalty for a recent
crime based on past crimes under recidivism statutes, so can a civil defendant be
subject to a higher civil penalty based on intensified misconduct when the harm
is claimed to reach beyond the plaintiff to nonparties. 174
Due to this distinction and the "risks of unfairness" to the defendant if
the jury does not comprehend the difference between direct punishment and
reprehensibility, the Court held the Due Process Clause mandates that states
provide some kind of procedures to give surety that when calculating punitive
damages, juries are giving effect to harm to nonparties only to the extent of
figuring reprehensibility.175 This procedural protection was considered vital
given the "constitutional importance" of ensuring the defendant is given fair
notice of the possible penalty faced for the illegality, the award is not arbitrary,
and the defendant is fairly able to defend against the charges. 176

170 Id. at 355. Presenting evidence of harm to nonparties allegedly caused by the defendant is
relevant in determining the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct because actions are more
reprehensible when they pose a greater risk of harm to the general public in addition to the harm
caused to the plaintiff. See id.

See id.
Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 357.
173Id. The Court cites to Witte v. United States, which concerned what constitutes "punishment"
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995). In this vein, the Witte Court
171

172

confirmed that recidivism statutes do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the enhanced
punishment for the subsequent crime is not an "additional penalty," but rather the most recent crime
is viewed as an "aggravated offense" worthy of a heightened penalty because it is repetitive. Id. at
400.
174 See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 357.
175 Id. at 355.
176 See id. In regard to the kind of procedures required to ensure the jury makes the correct
distinction, the majority admitted it is an unachievable task for state courts to actually know if the
jury derives an amount in order to directly punish the defendant for injury caused to nonparties or
indirectly as part of the reprehensibility calculus. Id. at 357. The solution calls for states to adopt
procedures that do not create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of the jury confusing
reprehensibility and direct punishment of nonparties. !d. The Court leaves the configuration of
such procedures up to the states, but warns that some protection is essential to protect the defendant
from an award issued by a jury that misunderstands the distinction. Id. The Court references the
instruction Philip Morris urged the trial court to adopt by noting it distinguishes between using
nonparty injury to determine reprehensibility and using nonparty injury to directly punish, but did
not expressly hold such an instruction satisfies due process concerns. Id. at 356. It is unclear how
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Justice Stevens authored a dissent that discarded the Court's three
reasons for denying states the ability to punish civil defendants for harm to
nonparties due to the belief that there is "no reason" to exclude such information
from the jury's calculation process.177 Justice Stevens emphasized the difference
between compensatory damages, which are an embodiment of the harm the
defendant caused to the plaintiff, and punitive damages, which share the same
aim of criminal sanctions, deterrence and punishment. 178 Given the similarity to
criminal punishment, Justice Stevens argued that a defendant's harm to third
parties is a relevant consideration in formulating a proper sanction for the public
harm caused.179 In other words, the thrust of punitive awards and criminal
penalties is to punish and a state may legitimately punish a defendant, civil or
criminal, for harm inflicted upon society, which includes individuals outside
parties to civil litigation. 180

c.

Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker

A year after the Supreme Court struck down the use of punitive damages
to directly punish a defendant for harm to anyone other than parties to the
broadly or narrowly Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) will be interpreted by
lower courts. In 2008, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado refused to
broadly interpret Philip Morris and held that a jury instruction that defined "willful and wanton
conduct" to include actions that were done without taking into account the "rights and safety of
others" was constitutional because it did not create a significant risk that the jury awarded punitive
damages in part to punish the Defendant for harm to nonparties. Cook v. Rockwell Internal Corp.,
564 F.Supp. 2d 1189, 1212 (D. Colo. 2008).
177 Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 358, 360 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178Id at 359. Justice Stevens points out that in Oregon, punitive damages are especially analogous
to criminal sanctions where the punitive award is paid partially or entirely to the state and not to the
plaintiff. Id at 359.
79Id. at 358-59. Justice Stevens refers in his dissent to the Oregon statute governing the allocation
of punitive damages. Id. at 359. This statute provides in part:
(I) Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of punitive
damages, the Department of Justice shall become a judgment creditor as to the
punitive damages portion of the award . . . [which] shall be allocated as
follows:
(a) Forty percent shall be paid to the prevailing party. The attorney
for the prevailing party shall be paid out of the amount allocated under this
paragraph, in the amount agreed upon between the attorney and the prevailing
party. However, in no event may more than 20 percent of the amount awarded
as punitive damages be paid to the attorney for the prevailing party.
(b) Sixty percent shall be paid to the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Account of the Department of Justice Crime Victims' Assistance Section to be
used for the purposes set forth in ORS chapter 147.
OR. REv. STAT. § 31.735(1) (2003) (emphasis added).
180 See id. at 360. Justice Ginsburg authored a dissent joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas.
Id at 362-64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court should not have
vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment because the judgment was consistent with the
Court's punitive damage jurisprudence in BMW and State Farm. See id Justice Thomas wrote
separately only to emphasize his position that the Constitution does not restrain the amount of
punitive awards. Id at 361-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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litigation on due process grounds, the Court examined a punitive damages case of
first impression, not through a constitutional lens, but as a common law court
adjudicating maritime law. 181 In Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker, the Court
held that a punitive award under maritime law cannot exceed the compensatory
award when the defendant's conduct constitutes recklessness. 182 The Court
found that such is a "fair upper limit" because it adequately guards against
punitive awards that are "unpredictable and unnecessary, either for deterrence or
for measured retribution" and as a result no longer serve their purpose. 183
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez, owned by Exxon Shipping Company, spilled
eleven million gallons of oil into the Prince William Sound after it ran aground
on the Bligh Reef off the coast of Alaska. l84 Joseph Hazelwood captained the
Exxon Valdez on the night of the spill and was seen by witnesses consuming five
double vodkas before the ship left port that night. 185 Commercial fishermen,
Native Alaskans, and landowners (collectively Baker) filed suit against Exxon
seeking compensation for their economic loss caused by the spill. 186 Exxon
stipulated that it was negligent for the spill and liable for compensatory
damages. ls7 The trial consisted in part of deciding if Exxon was reckless and
consequently liable for punitive damages. 188 The jury found Exxon liable for five
billion dollars in punitive damages, which was eventually reduced to $2.5
billion. 189 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address, among other matters,
the boundaries of punitive awards under maritime common law. 190

181 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 488-89 (2008). The Court explained that it has
federal jurisdiction over maritime law and will decide the case as a common law court that is
subject to the legislation of Congress.
182Id. at 512-13. Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent that although such a rule may make sense in
the present case, the Court did not make clear what punitive limit would be appropriate in a case of
malice. Id. at 524 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183 Id. at 513.
184 Id. at 476,478.
185 I d. at 477. In addition, Captain Hazelwood had received alcohol treatment while working for
Exxon. Id.
186Id. at 476. The plaintiffs all relied on the Prince William Sound for income and living. Id. After
the spill, Exxon expended $2.1 billion in cleanup and pleaded guilty to several federal criminal
violations, which resulted in Exxon paying twenty-five million dollars in fines and $100 million in
restitution. Id. at 479. In addition, Exxon entered into a consent decree to pay a minimum of $900
million to restore natural resources in relation to a civil action filed by the United States and Alaska
for environmental harms. Id. Finally, Exxon paid $303 million to fishermen, property owners, and
others affected by the spill in voluntary settlements. Id.
187Id. at 479.
188 /d. The trial also involved the question of the recklessness of Hazelwood, the capital of the
Valdez, and his possible punitive liability. Id.
189 Id. at 481.
190 Id. The Court also addressed the issues of "whether maritime law allows corporate liability for
punitive damages on the basis of acts of managerial agents [and] whether the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.c. § 1251 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V) forecloses the award of
punitive damages in maritime spill cases." Id. at 481-90.
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In a comprehensive and detailed opinion delivered by Justice Souter, the
Court examined the history of punitive damages, rationales for awarding punitive
damages, state regulation of punitive damages, foreign treatment of punitive
damages, and a survey of current punitive damage awards prior to reaching the
conclusion that under federal maritime law, a punitive award may not exceed a
1: 1 ratio to compensatory damages in cases of recklessness. 191 In regard to the
current status of punitive awards, the Court evaluated "recent studies" and
concluded that the availability of a punitive remedy and the discretion of judges
and juries to figure its dollar amount have "not mass-produced runaway
awards.,,192 Rather, the actual trouble is large, unpredictable outlier awards. 193
The unpredictable feature of punitive awards, which encompasses
inconsistent punitive sums awarded in comparable cases, amounts to, in the
Court's opinion, a violation of the law's "sense of faimess.,,194 The Court

191/d. at 489-501,512-13. The Court began its discussion of the limitations of punitive damages in
federal maritime law by providing a short review of the history of punitive damages, including its
first appearance in America in 1763 and deeper roots in ancient times. Id. at 490-91. The Court
next detailed the historical reasons for awarding damages beyond those necessary for compensating
the plaintiff. Id. Such justifications include punishment for exceptional wrongdoing, deterrence,
and compensation for intangible wrongs. Id. at 490-92. The Court explained that in contemporary
society punitive damages are predominately awarded for the purpose of punishing and deterring
wrongful conduct and not to compensate the plaintiff. Id. at 492. Given the dual aims of
punishment and deterrence, more culpable conduct, such as malicious acts, would be subject to a
higher punitive award because such conduct is deserving of greater punishment and a greater need
for deterrence. See id. at 493-94. In addition, greater punitive awards are viewed as acceptable,
regardless of the defendant's blameworthiness, if the "wrongdoing is hard to detect" or "when the
value of injury and the corresponding compensatory award are small (providing low incentive to
sue)." Id. at 494. Next, the Court provided an overview of state regulation of punitive damages,
including examples of states that impose monetary caps on punitive awards by statute or use a
maximum ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Id. at 495-96. The Court then
briefly compared the United States to other countries in regard to punitive damages, highlighting
that even with state imposed limitations punitive damage awards are larger and given more often in
the United States than other countries. See id. at 497 (internal citations omitted).
1921d. at 497 (referencing T. Eisenberg et aI., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical
Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 269 (2006)). The Court explains that most studies show that the
median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards is less than 1:1. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at
497. In a footnote, the Court reveals that a median ratio of 0.62:1 of punitive to compensatory
awards was reported in a study using Bureau of Justice Statistics from 1992, 1996, and 2001. Id. at
499 n.14 (referencing Eisenberg et aI., supra). This statistic indicates that generally punitive
awards do not exceed compensatory awards and the Court believes this suggests that a punitive
award that is much larger than a compensatory award is not needed to accomplish the goal of
~unishment or deterrence. See id. at 498-99.
93 Id. at 499-500.
194 See id. at 502. The Court expresses that punitive awards that are consistent and predictable are
fair. See id. at 499. In light of statistical data on punitive damages, the Court determines that
punitive awards are varied in amount and outlier awards are disturbingly higher than compensatory
awards. Id. at 499-500 (referencing Eisenberg et aI., supra note 192). Such information in
isolation could be positive if it meant that amounts are wide-ranging because they reflect the
different circumstances of each case and are configured to award a sum most favorable to
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stressed that the "constitutional significance of the unpredictability of high
punitive awards" is not within the realm of review because the Court approaches
this issue as a common law court that retains the duty to regulate common law
remedies, such as punitive damages, in absence oflegislation. 195 With the goal of
regulating punitive damages, as a common law remedy, the Court declares that
punitive damages as a penalty should consistently be of a similar amount for
similar factual circumstances. 196 Interestingly, the Court analogizes to Koon v.
United States, a criminal case, for the proposition that in order for punitive
damages to effectively deter misconduct they must be "reasonably predictable in
severity" and consistent in amount between similar cases. 197 In Koon, the Court
made clear that sentencing guidelines in criminal cases allow for predictability
and uniformity in the criminal justice system. 198
Given the similar aims of punishment and deterrence, the Court looked to
the tribulations of federal criminal sentencing for insight in its search for a
judicial solution. 199 The Court rejected a verbal approach like mandating stricter
judicial review of jury punitive awards through the use of specified criteria?OO
The Court did not think such an approach would produce consistency where the
"old federal sentencing system of general standards" was eliminated due to its
failure to produce consistent sentences for similarly situated offenders. 201 The
accomplish punishment and deterrence in a particular circumstance. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S.
at 499-500. Based upon anecdotal evidence, it appears to the Court that cases with similar
circumstances do not result in similar punitive awards. Id. For example, in the BMW case, where
the jury awarded four million dollars in punitive damages, the Court's opinion highlighted that
another case in the same state with very similar facts resulted in a similar amount of compensatory
damages, but no punitive award. See BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 565 n.8 (1996).
Therefore, high outlier punitive awards are unpredictable because high punitive sums are not
consistently awarded "in cases involving similar claims and circumstances." Exxon Shipping Co.,
554 U.S. at 499-500.
195 Id. at 502.
196 See id. Some commentators suggest that the Exxon case served as an opportunity for the Court
to illustrate the faults it perceives in the punitive damage system and as a result reveals "the Court's
motivation for its current regulation of punitive damages." Fisher, supra note 135, at 15.
197
Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 502; Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)
(remarking that the aim of Sentencing Guidelines in criminal cases is to "reduce unjustified
disparities" and achieve "evenhandedness and neutrality" that are key components of "any
principled system of justice").
198 Id. at 113.
199 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 505-06. Although in Exxon the Court references and relies on
criminal sentencing reforms in its punitive damage analysis, such as not always been the case. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1051 (2004)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has been inconsistent in its approaches to criminal
sentencing and punitive damages).
zoo See Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 503-04. The Court points to Maryland as an example ofa
state that has implemented such an approach. Id. Under its common law authority, the Maryland
Court of Appeals established nine factors for reviewing courts to utilize in determining whether a
rcunitive award is excessive. Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710 A.2d 267,278 (Md. 1998).
01 See Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 505. Before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was made
into law, there were no legal restraints on the sentencing power of a judge, except extremely high
maximum punishments. Fisher, supra note 135, at 17. This discretion dominated system allowed
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old federal sentencing system was replaced by a statutory "system of detailed
guidelines tied to exactly quantified sentencing results."202 The quantified
system removed the discretion of judges that had led to arbitrarily diverse
sentences for offenders in similar situations.203 For that reason, the Court
believed a similar approach would be necessary to eliminate unpredictable outlier
punitive awards that are bound to occur without numerical limits. 204
In correspondence with the need for a numerical standard to limit
discretion and hence minimize unpredictable and inconsistent awards, the Court
determined that linking punitive awards to compensatory damages through a
mandatory ratio would best serve such a desire,z°5 In figuring the proper ratio,
the Court sought numerical reasonableness and located it in studies examining
the ratio of punitive to compensatory verdicts. 206 These studies implied what
juries and judges have deemed reasonable "economic penalties" in cases ranging
from recklessness to malice. 207 Such studies place the median ratio at less than
1: 1, which means that for the most part punitive awards do not surpass
compensatory awards,z°8 Therefore, the Court held a 1: 1 ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages is a "fair upper limit" in maritime cases and
properly accomplishes the dual aims of punishment and deterrence. 209 Since the
District Court calculated compensatory damages at $507.5 million, the punitive
award could not exceed that amount. 210
judges to "impose any length of punishment for virtually any reason," which led to varied
sentencing results among felons. Id.
202 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 505.
203Id.
204 /d.
205 Id. at 506. The Court rejects setting an absolute monetary cap on punitive awards, which it
admits would most mirror criminal law's use of maximum sentences. Id. This is so because it
would be difficult to figure a dollar amount that would be proper in all civil cases and it appears
that the legislature would be better suited to institute such a scheme. Id.
206 Id. at 512.
207/d. One commentator points out that the Court's method closely resembles the acts of Congress
when it undertook the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Fisher, supra note 135, at 18. Specifically,
data regarding what punishment was actually given for certain crimes was viewed as a whole and
the median was the basis for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
208 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 513 (referencing Eisenberg et aI., supra note 192).
209Id.
210 Id. at 515. The Court vacated and remanded the case in order for the Court of Appeals to remit
the punitive award in conformity with the decision. Id. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined
the majority opinion, but composed a brief concurrence emphasizing that the Constitution does not
place limits on punitive damages. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred in part and
dissented as to the Court's opinion regarding the punitive damage aspect of the case. /d. at 516
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens dissented mainly because of
his disagreement with the Court's formation of an empirical judgment because he felt Congress, not
the Court, should make such decisions. Id. at 516-23. Justice Ginsburg also dissented in regard to
the Court's opinion addressing punitive damages and agreed with Justice Stevens that the decision
to repair punitive damages in maritime law is one that should be made by Congress. /d. at 523-25
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Breyer also dissented in regard to
the punitive damage portion of the Court's opinion. Id. at 525-26 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Breyer argued there was not a need to reduce the punitive award in
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The Supreme Court's ratio approach is no more logical than allowing a
jury to freely award punitive awards without structure or guidance. Yet, as the
court has embraced this approach, plaintiffs will feel their potential recovery has
been artificially limited.
III. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's efforts to control jury discretion in both death
penalty and punitive damages cases have been clearly met with mixed results.
The death penalty jurisprudence which has waffled between protecting against
arbitrary sentences brought about by victim impact evidence created a roller
coaster ride of unstable precedents in the Supreme Court which allowed only
vague due process protection from inflammatory victim information. The
punitive damages cases took an ironically different approach, limiting victim
information in order to protect corporations from possible debilitating verdicts in
civil damages cases. Both approaches have a certain intellectual inconsistency.
There is no way to reconcile the due process doctrine in either line of authority
without more concrete guiding principles.
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code offers some hope of
placing a proper due process framework around civil damages issues where it
failed in death penalty cases. It offers the advantage of protecting corporations
from total exposure to arbitrary juries. It also avoids the current broad "ratio
approach" approved by the Supreme Court to limit the historical role of juries to
provide punitive judgments in civil cases. Use of an approach that heavily
embraces the Model Penal Code principles of identifying and weighing
aggravating and mitigating factors when imposing punitive damages awards
provides adequate protection for corporate defendants while respecting the
traditional role of the jury as monitor and conscious of the community.

this case, but did agree with the Court that punitive awards need to be issued in compliance with
"meaningful standards" so that defendants have notice of the severity of their possible punishment
and to ensure consistency of awards for similar conduct. Id. This position corresponds to Justice
Breyer's reputation as the "architect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Court's chief
defender of the Guidelines." However, Justice Breyer felt that the facts of this case would warrant
an exception to the 1: 1 ratio rule because Exxon's conduct was exceedingly reprehensible. Id. at
525 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

